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11 Introduction
In this paper we study semi-inﬁnite transportation situations with inﬁnitely divis-
ible goods and their corresponding (cooperative) transportation games. Special
attention is paid to conditions (if any) under which there exist core elements or
so-called "-core elements of the transportation games.
In a (ﬁnite) transportation situation, units of a single indivisible good are
transported from a ﬁnite number of suppliers to a ﬁnite number of demanders. If
one unit of the good is transported from supplier i to demander j then this gives
these agents a beneﬁt of tij units. Of course, a supplier cannot supply more goods
than he owns and a demander does not want to receive more units than she asked
for. The goal of the suppliersandthe demandersis tomaximizetheir total beneﬁts
under these restrictions.
S´ anchez-Soriano, L´ opez and Garc´ ıa-Jurado ([8]) studied the core of trans-
portation games, which are cooperative games arising from ﬁnite transportation
situations. They show that there always exists an optimal solution of the dual
linear program related to such a transportation situation. Any of these optimal
solutions generates a core element of the transportation game but the set of core
elements generated in this way need not exhaust the core.
Assignment situations are transportation situations where each supplier owns
one unit of the good and each demander wants one unit of the good. In a sense,
one is assigning a supplier to a demander and vice versa. Finite assignment
games were ﬁrst studied by Shapley and Shubik ([9]). Llorca, Tijs and Timmer
([5]) studied a semi-inﬁnite extension of these games, namely games related to
assignment situations witha countablyinﬁnitenumberof demanders. Other semi-
inﬁnite games arising from different linear programmingsituations are studied by
Fragnelli, Patrone, Sideri and Tijs ([1]) and by Timmer, Llorca and Tijs ([10]).
A semi-inﬁnite extension of transportation situations with indivisible goods
is studied by S´ anchez-Soriano, Llorca, Tijs and Timmer ([7]). Using the results
of Llorca et al. ([5]), they show that the underlying inﬁnite programs have no
duality gap and that the core of the corresponding game is nonempty. Kortanek
andYamasaki([3],[4])alsostudysemi-inﬁnitetransportationsituations. Themain
difference with our analysis is that they assume that the total supply and the total
demand for the good are equal (and consequently, ﬁnite) whereas we assume
nothing about these quantities. Our analysis includes situations where the total
supply is unequal to the total demand and situations with an inﬁnitetotal demand.
Further, we study semi-inﬁnite transportation situations from a game-theoretic
point of view, while they do not.
2In this paper we study semi-inﬁnite transportation situations with inﬁnitely
divisible goods and related games. These situations have a ﬁnite number of
suppliers and a countably inﬁnite number of demanders. The good that will be
transported is assumed to be inﬁnitely divisible. The goal of the suppliers and
demanders is to maximize their total beneﬁt such that no supplier supplies too
much and any demander receives at most what she asked for. We start by showing
that the underlying primal and dual inﬁnite programs have no duality gap. In the
proofofthisresultweneedthecorrespondingresultforsemi-inﬁnitetransportation
situations with indivisible goods by S´ anchez-Soriano et al. ([7]). After this, the
existence of so-called "-core elements is shown. These are allocations of the
total beneﬁt over all suppliers and demanders in such a way that the gain of a
subgroup of agents obtained by splitting off is at most ", an arbitrarily small
positive number. Finally we consider two types of situations: those with ﬁnite or
inﬁnite total demand. For both types of situations we show that there exist core
elements of the corresponding transportation games. For the second type we need
some conditions on the demands to achieve this result.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In the next section we present
the main results for games arising from ﬁnite transportation situations and from
semi-inﬁnite transportation situations with indivisible goods. In section 3, games
corresponding to semi-inﬁnite transportation situations with inﬁnitely divisible
goods are introduced. We show that the underlying inﬁnite programs have no
duality gap. It is shown in section 4 that there always exist "-core elements.
Next, we consider two types of situations. In section 5 we study situations
with a ﬁnite total demand. We prove that the core of the corresponding game
is nonempty. Finally, in section 6 we consider situations with an inﬁnite total
demand. Conditions are provided under which the core of the corresponding
game is nonempty.
2 Transportation problems and games
A(ﬁnite)transportationproblemdescribes asituation in which demands at several
locations for a certain indivisible good will be covered by supplies from other
locations. The total demand for the good need not equal the total supply of the
good. Transporting one unit of the good from a supply point to a demand point
generates a certain proﬁt. The goal of the suppliers and demanders is to ﬁnd a
transportation plan (how many of the good should be transported from any of the
supply points to any of the demand points) that maximizes the total proﬁt.
3A transportation problem is a tuple (P;Q;T;s;d)where P and Q are respec-
tively the ﬁnite sets of supply points and demand points. The transport of one
unit of the good from supply point i to demand point j generates a proﬁt of tij,a
non-negative real number. The matrix T =[ t ij]i2P;j2Q contains all the proﬁts per
unit of the good. The supply at point i 2 P equals si units of the good and the
demand at j 2 Q is dj unitswherebothsi and dj arenatural numbers. The vectors
s = fsigi2P and d = fdjgj2Q contain respectively the supplies and demands of
the good. For the sake of brevity we will use T to denote (P;Q;T;s;d).
AtransportationplanX =[ x ij]i2P;j2Qisamatrixwherexij  0isthenumber
of units of the good that will be transported from supply point i to demand point
j. A supply point i 2 P can supply at most si units of the good,
P
j2Q xij  si,
and a demand point j 2 Q wants to receive at most dj units,
P
i2P xij  dj.T h e

















A transportation plan X is also called a feasible solution for T. Such a solution
is optimal if it attains the maximal proﬁt,
P
(i;j)2PQ tijxij = vp(T).I t i s w e l l
known that if we allow xij to be a nonnegative real number instead of an integer
number then there exists an optimal integer solution.
Given a transportation problem T, the corresponding transportation game
(N;w)is a cooperativetransferableutility (TU) game with player set N = P [Q.
Let S  N, S 6= ;, be a coalition of players and deﬁne PS = P \ S and
QS = Q \ S.I fS=P Sor S = QS, there are either only suppliers or demanders
present, then no transport can take place and the worth w(S) of coalition S equals
zero. Otherwise, the worth w(S) depends upon the transportation plans for this
coalition. A transportation plan X(S) for coalition S is a transportation plan for



















is the worth of coalition S. By convention w(;)=0 .
InS´ anchez-Sorianoetal.([7])theseﬁnitetransportationproblemsareextended
to semi-inﬁnite transportation problems in which the set of demanders is the
4countably inﬁnite set Q =I N(where IN is the set of natural numbers). Further si
anddj arenaturalnumbersforalli 2 P andj 2 Q;andthematrixT =[ t ij]i2P; j2Q
is bounded, kTk1 := sup(i;j)2PQ jtijj < 1. We call these discrete situations
since all the supplies and demands are integer numbers; we consider indivisible
goods. This kind of situation can appear, for example, if a good has to be
transported in containers from a ﬁnite set of warehouses to an inﬁnite set of
potential consumers.
Associated to such a semi-inﬁnite transportation problem is a semi-inﬁnite
transportation game (N;w) with player set N = P [ Q. As before, the worth of


















otherwise. If we allow xij to be a nonnegative real number then the dual problem





















with value vd(T). Notice that the primal and dual programs have an inﬁnite
number of variables and an inﬁnite number of constraints. S´ anchez-Soriano et al.
([7]) show that the primal and dual problem have the same value and that there
exist optimal solutions for D.
When thinking about how to share the proﬁt among the suppliers and the
demanders, onecan consider to sharetheproﬁt accordingto an element in thecore











i2 N x i = w (N )a n d
P
i 2 Sx iw ( S ) for all S  N; S 6= ;
)
:
If a core-element x is proposed as a distribution of the total proﬁt w(N), then
each coalition S will get at least as much as it can obtain on its own because
P
i2S xi  w(S). This implies that no coalition has an incentive to disagree with
this proposal. A concept related to the core is the so-called Owen set1,w h i c hi s
1Owen ([6]) presents a method to ﬁnd a nonempty subset of the core of a linear production











9(u;v)o p t i m a lf o rDsuch that xk = skuk
if k 2 P and xk = dkvk if k 2 Q
)
:
An element of the Owen set is easy to ﬁnd and it turns out to be an element of the
core of the corresponding transportation game as well, that is, Owen(T)  C(w).
From now on, we will consider a more general type of semi-inﬁnite trans-
portation problems in which the supplies si and the demands dj are positive real
numbers. We call these continuous situations. The underlying idea is to consider
inﬁnitely divisible goods like, e.g., gas or electricity.
3 A no-duality-gap theorem
In this section we show that (semi-inﬁnite) continuous transportation situations
have no duality gap, that is, vp(T)=v d( T) .
Let T be a continuous transportation problem and let >0be a positive
number. We scale the problem T in units of  and we use overestimates and
underestimates of the scaled supplies and demands to obtain two discrete trans-
portation problems T + and T − that are related to T. With the help of these
discrete problems we can show the absence of a duality gap between the primal
and dual problems for T.
For a nonnegative real number a, the notations dae and bac stand for respec-
tively the upper and lower integer part of a.S o ,a−1b a cad a ea+1
and bac;dae2f 0 ; 1 ; 2 ; 3 ;:::g. The discrete problem T +, which refers to


































for all i 2 P and j 2 Q.T h ev a l u e s v p ( T  + )and vp(T −) are closely related to
the value vp(T) as the following lemma shows.
Lemma 3.1 Let T be a continuous transportation problem and T +, T − the
associated discrete problems for >0 . Then the following inequalities hold.
61. vp(T)  vp(T +)  vp(T)+m kTk1,
2. vp(T)  vp(T −)  vp(T)− m kTk1.













ij = tij for all i 2 P; j 2 Q:
This problem is obtained from the original one by scaling into units of . So, both
T and T 0 have the same value, vp(T)=v p( T0) .
Let X0 be a feasible transportation plan for T 0; then it is also feasible for T +.
Therefore vp(T 0)  vp(T +). On the other hand, in T + we have at most m
units of the good more than in T 0 because of the overestimations, so vp(T +) will
exceed vp(T 0) with at most mkTk1. Hence vp(T +)  vp(T 0)+mk Tk1 =
vp(T)+mkTk1.
To show the second item, let X be a feasible transportation plan for T −.
Such a plan is also feasible for T 0 and therefore vp(T 0)  vp(T −).O n t h e
other hand, in T 0 we have at most m units of the good more than in T −,s o
v p ( T 0 )will exceed vp(T −) with at most in mkTk1. Hence vp(T)=v p( T 0)
v p( T  −)+mk Tk1.
2
The next lemma shows that the dual value of the original problem is bounded
by the dual values of the related discrete problems.
Lemma 3.2 Let T be a continuous transportation problem and T +, T − the
associated discrete problems for >0 . Then
vd(T
−)  vd(T)  vd(T
+):
Proof. Let T 0 be the continuous transportation problem as deﬁned in the proof
of lemma 3.1. Notice that the dual programs related to T +;T 0and T − have
the same sets of feasible solutions. For the coefﬁcients of the objective functions











j . Also, we are dealing with
inﬁmum problems, so vd(T −)  vd(T 0)  vd(T +).
We continue by showing vd(T)=v d( T0) .L e t( u;v) be a feasible solution for
D. Deﬁne the pair (u0;v0)by u
0
i = ui and v0
j = vj. Then (u0;v0)is a feasible





















7From this we conclude that vd(T)=v d( T0) , which ﬁnishes the proof.
2
Now we present the main result in this section, which tell us that there is no
duality gap for continuous transportation problems.
Theorem 3.3 Let T be a continuous transportation problem. Then,
vp(T)=v d( T) :
Proof. From part 2 in lemma 3.1 and weak duality, we know that
vp(T)− mkTk1  vp(T −)  vp(T)  vd(T): (3.1)
On the other hand, from the previous lemma, the absence of duality gaps for
discrete problems (S´ anchez-Soriano et al. [7]) and part 1 in lemma 3.1, we obtain
vd(T)  vd(T
+)=v p( T
 +)v p( T)+m kTk1 : (3.2)
The desired result is obtained from the observation that (3.1) and (3.2) hold for all
>0 :
2
4 Transportation games possess "-core elements
Nowweknowthattheprimaland thedualprogramsofacontinuoustransportation
problem have the same value, we can look at the problem of the division of
vp(T)=v d( T)among the involved agents.
For an arbitrary TU game (N;w),w h e r eNis a ﬁnite or a countably inﬁnite
player set and w :2 N !IR is a map assigning to each coalition S  N a real
number and w(;)=0 , interesting reward allocations are "-core elements, where
"  0. We say that z 2 IR
N is an "-core element of the game (N;w) if the








zi  w(S) −" for all S  N (4.2)
So, an "-coreelement divides w(N) among theplayers, and a coalition S can gain
at most " by splitting off. An "-core element with " =0is called a core element.
Interesting questions for arbitrary games are: do there exist core elements and do
8there exist "-core elements for each ">0 ? For ﬁnite transportation games the
answer to both questions is yes. For semi-inﬁnite transportation games we will
give an afﬁrmative answer to the second question in the theorem below. We do
not know the answer to the ﬁrst question for general semi-inﬁnite transportation
games. Partial afﬁrmative answers are given in the sections 5 and 6.
To ﬁnd an "-core element, ">0 , of the transportation game we will use
almost optimal solutions of the dual problem. This is done in the proof of the next
theorem.
Theorem 4.1 Let ">0and let (N;w) be the cooperative game corresponding
to the continuous transportation problem T as deﬁned earlier. Then there exists a
vector z 2 IR
N which is an "-core element.
Proof. Ifw(N)=0then0 2 IR
N isan"-coreelementforeach"  0. So,suppose
thatw(N) 6=0 .T a k e>0such that" =( 1+ ) − 1w(N).L e t( u;v) 2 IR
P  IR
Q






djvj  (1 + )vd(T):
We call (u;v) a vd(T)-optimal solution of the dual transportation problem. Let






djvj =( 1+ 0) v d( T) :
Deﬁne z 2 IR
N by zi =( 1+ 0) − 1s iu ifor all i 2 P and zj =( 1+ 0) − 1d jv jfor
all j 2 Q. We claim that z is an "-core element of the game (N;w). Clearly, the
efﬁciency condition (4.1) holds:
X
i2N
zi = vd(T)=v p( T)=w ( N)
where we use the no-gap result of theorem 3.3. To show condition (4.2), note ﬁrst
that for S  P or S  Q we have
P
i2S zi  0=w ( S )w ( S )−" .T a k eSsuch















i 2 P S
s iu i+
X




 (1 + 
0)








 w(S) − (1 + )
−1w(N)=w ( S )−"
9where the ﬁrst inequality follows from w(S)=v p( T S)=v d( T S)
P
i 2 P Ss iu i+
P
i 2 Q Sd jv j. Thesecondinequalityfollowsfromthemonotonicityofw:f o rSU
we have w(S)=v p( T S)v p( T U)=w ( U) . The last inequality holds because the
function f(x)=( 1+x ) − 1xis increasing in x for x  0 and 0  . We conclude
that (4.2) is satisﬁed for z, which ﬁnishes the proof.
2
5 Transportation problems with ﬁnite total demand
Inthissection weconsider continuoustransportationproblems(P;Q;T;s;d)with
kTk1 < 1 and also, without loss of generality,with si > 0 for all i 2 P.F u r t h e r
we put the following condition on the demands.
(Finite demand) kdk1 :=
X
j2Q
dj < 1 (5.1)
Forthistypeoftransportationproblemsweshowthatthecoreofthecorresponding










where a+ is shorthand for maxfa;0g, a 2 IR. This ﬁt map has the following
properties for all x;y 2 IR
P
+;i2Pand j 2 Q.
0  fj(x) k Tk 1 (5.2)
xi + fj(x)  tij (5.3)
jfj(x)− fj(y)jk y−x k 1:= maxfjyi−xijji2Pg (5.4)
Condition (5.4) follows from the observation
−jy i−x ij( t ij − xi)+ − (tij − yi)+ j y i−x ij
for all j 2 Q. From (5.4) we can deduce for all x;y 2 IR
P
+
kf (x) − f (y )k 1 k y−x k 1 (5.5)
where kak1 := supfjajjjj2Qgfor all a 2 IR
Q. From (5.2) and (5.3) follows




+ is a feasible solution of the dual program D
for all x 2 IR
P
+. Furthermore,
vj  fj(u) for all feasible solutions (u;v) for D and all j 2 Q: (5.6)
10The theorem below shows the nonemptiness of the core of a transportation game
in this setting.
Theorem 5.1 Let T be a continuous transportation problem with kTk1 < 1,
s>0 , and kdk1 < 1. Then the corresponding transportation game (N;w) has
C(w) 6= ;.
Proof. For each " 2 (0;1] take an "-optimal solution (u(");v(")) of D (see the







d jv j( " )v d( T)+":
In view of (5.6) we can assume that v(")=f( u ( " )). Take a decreasing sequence
"(1), "(2), :::in (0;1] that converges to 0 such that the sequence u("(1)), u("(2)),







i2 P s ia i  v d(T )+1
o
, which is a compact2 set. Then
limk!1 u("(k)) =  u holds as a limit with respect to the kk1-norm. Let z 2 IR
N
be deﬁned by zi = si ui for all i 2 P and zj = djfj( u) for all j 2 Q. We show
that z is a core element of (N;w).
First note that by (5.5)
lim
k!1
k(u("(k));f(u("(k))))− ( u;f( u))k1 =0
where k(a;b)k1 =m a x fkak1 ;kbk1g for a 2 IR
P , b 2 IR
Q. Since the set of
feasible solutions of D is closed with respect to kk1-limits we conclude that


















djfj( u)=v p( T) :
We know that for all k 2 IN
v p(T ) 
X
i2 P




2This follows from s>0 .







si (ui("(k)) −  ui)+
X
j2 Q
d j( f j( u ( " ( k))) − fj( u))
1
A =0 : (5.7)
The absolute value of the expression behind the limit is at most equal to
(
P




kf(u("(k))) − f( u)k1
 (ksk1 +kdk1)ku("(k))−  uk1
where the inequality follows from (5.5). Now (5.7) follows from (5.1) and from
limk!1 ku("(k))−  uk1 =0 .
2
6 Transportation problems with inﬁnite total de-
mand
In this section we consider semi-inﬁnite continuous transportation problems T
with inﬁnite total demand,
P
j2Q dj = 1, such that
dj  >0for all j 2 Q: (6.1)
We assume that all demanders in Q want to receive at least the positive amount .
Wecaninterpretthisamount astheminimalusefulamountofthegood. Ourgoal
is to prove that the core of the corresponding transportation game is nonempty.
Weachieve thisresult invarioussteps, startingwithaproceduretolookforaﬁnite
transportation problem that is closely related to T.
Given aproblemT asabove, ademanderj0 is calledagood isolated demander
for a supply point i if jfjjtij  tij0gj < 1. We denote the set of good isolated
demanders for i by GID(i). For each supplier i we introduce a number ti using
the set GID(i). Two cases can arise:
a. If GID(i)=; ;then ti =0 :








minfk 2 Qjvp(Ti)=v p( Tk
i) g ;
P
h 2 Ps h
P
j 2 GID(i) dj;
where Ti refers to (fig;Q;[t ij]j2Q;
P
h2P sh;d) and T k





12Now, deﬁne t =m a x i 2 Pt i . Closely related to T is the ﬁnite transportation




tij;j  t  ;
supftikjk  t +1 g;j = t  +1 :
The demand vector  d, which has t +1entries, is deﬁned by  dj = dj if j  t and
 dt+1 =
P
h2P sh +1 . The example below illustrates this method.
Example 6.1 Consider the semi-inﬁnite transportation situation (P;Q;T;s;d)
with P = f1;2;3;4g, Q = f1;2;:::g, d =( 2 : 3 ; 5 ; 5 ; 5 ; 1 : 7 ; 3 ; 2 ; 1 ; 1 ; 1 ;:::),
s=( 2 ;1 : 1 ;4 : 4 ;3) and with T as below.
2:3 555 1 : 73 2 1 1 1 1 d j
2 5555554555 5
1:1 81 3 1



















In this situation we have GID(1) = ;, GID(2) = f1;5;6g, GID(3) = ; and
GID(4) = f2;3;4g. Consequently, t1 = t3 =0 . To determine t2 we notice that
P
h2P sh =1 0 : 5>d 1+d 5+d 6=7 . Thus t2 =m a x f j j j2GID(2)g =6 .
Finally, for t4 we have
P
h2P sh =1 0 : 5<d 2+d 3+d 4=1 5 . Hence, t4 =
minfk 2 Qjvp(T4)=v p( Tk
4) gwith
T4 :
2:35551 : 7321111 d j




so, t4 =4 .N o wt =m a x f 0 ;6 ;0 ;4 g=6and
 T :
2:35 5 51 : 731 1 : 5 d j
2555555 5
1 : 1 81 3
1
2 267 4











is the ﬁnite transportation problem related to T.
13Lemma 6.1 Let T be a transportation problem as deﬁned above, and let  T be the
corresponding ﬁnite transportation problem. Then,
vp(T)=v p( T) :
Proof. Let X be a feasible plan for T. Deﬁne the plan  X for  T as follows:
 xij =
(
xij;j  t  ;
P 1
k = t  +1 xik;j = t  +1 :































For any feasible plan X forT there exists a feasible plan  X for  T with a valuethat
is equal or larger. Hence, vp(  T)  vp(T):
Next, weshowthatvp(T)  vp( T)−" forall">0 . Withoutlossof generality
assume that
P
i2P si > 0.L e t">0 ,l e ti2Pand let  X be an optimal solution
for  T. Deﬁne the plan X for T by xij = x ij, j  t.I f  x i ( t  +1) =0then
deﬁne xij =0for all j>t  . Otherwise there exists a ﬁnite set of demanders
K  Q such that
P
j2K dj   xi(t+1) and for all j 2 K it holds that j>t and
tij   ti(t+1) − "=
P
i2P si. This ﬁnite set K exists because of condition (6.1).
Nowwe can dividethe amount  xi(t+1) over the demandersin K ina feasible way.






































 xij tij − ":
We conclude that vp(T)  vp( T) − " for all ">0 .
2
14Example 6.2 For the situation in example 6.1 we have vp(T)=s 1t 12 + s2t21 +
s3 supj2Q t3j + s4t43 =4 8 : 6and vp(  T)=s 1 t 12 + s2 t21 + s3 t37 + s4 t43 =4 8 : 6 .
Thefollowingexampleindicatesthatcondition(6.1)isnecessaryinlemma6.1.













In this situation the total demand is inﬁnite and infj2Qdj =0 . Hence, condi-












which lies in-between 2 and 3. The core of the corresponding one-person game
is C(w)=f v p ( T ) g .F r o m GID(1) = ; we obtain t = t1 =0 . The ﬁnite





with value vp( T)=4 . We conclude that vp(T) 6= vp( T).
The lemma below shows that any optimal solutionfor D(  T), the dual problem
related to  T, has a special property.
Lemma 6.2 LetT beatransportation problemasabove,and  T thecorresponding
ﬁnite problem. If ( u;  v) is optimal for D(  T) then  vt+1 =0 .
Proof. Since  T is a ﬁnite problem we know that there exist optimal solutions for
D( T) and for  T itself. Let ( u;  v) be optimal for D(  T) and let  X be an optimal

































Together with (6.2) we conclude that  vt+1 =0 .
2
With this result we can show that there exists an optimal solution for the dual
problem related to T.
Theorem 6.3 Let T be a transportation problem as above. Then there exists an
optimal solution for D(T).
Proof. Let T be a transportation problem with inﬁnite demand and  T the corre-
sponding ﬁnite problem. Let ( u;  v) be optimal for D(  T).S o ,
(
 u i+ v j t ij = tij;i 2 P; j  t;
 ui + v t +1   ti(t+1) =s u pf t ijjj  t +1 g;i 2 P:
From lemma 6.2 we know  vt+1 =0 .D e ﬁ n e ( v)=(  v 1;:::; v t ;0;0;:::). Then
 ui  supftij : j  t +1 gwhich implies  ui + ( v)j  tij for all i 2 P and
j  t +1 . Hence, ( u;( v)) is a feasible solution for D(T).
According to lemma 6.1
vp(T)=v p (  T )=v d( T)=
X
i 2 P










dj( v)j  vd(T)=v p( T)
where the inequality follows from ( u;( v)) being a feasible solution for D(T).





dj( v)j = vd(T);
the solution ( u;( v)) is optimal for D(T).
2
Finally, we are able to show that the corresponding cooperative game has a
nonempty core.
16Theorem 6.4 Let T be a transportation problem as above and (N;w) its corre-
sponding game. Then the core of this game, C(w), is a nonempty set.
Proof. Fromtheorem 6.3 we knowthat thereexists an optimal solutionforD(T).
Let (u;v) be such an optimal solution. Deﬁne the vector x by xk = skuk for
k 2 P and xk = dkvk for k 2 Q. Then x 2Owen(T)  C(w).
2
Example 6.4 Consider once again the semi-inﬁnite transportation situation in
example 6.1. An optimal solution for D( T) is ( u;  v) with  u =( 5 ; 8 ; 2 ; 7) and
 v =( 0 ;:::;0). Then ( u;( v)) is optimal for D(T) with ( v)=( 0 ; 0 ;:::).
According to the previous theorem, the vector x = ((10;8:8;8:8;21);(0;0;:::))
is an element of the core C(w).
As example 6.3 shows the procedure used in this section to ﬁnd core elements
cannot be used to prove that the core of a more general semi-inﬁnite continuous
transportation game with inﬁnite total demand is nonempty. An alternative ap-
proachcouldbetheonedescribedin section5, butitfailsbecause thetotaldemand
isinﬁnite. So,itremainsan openquestion whetherthecoreisnonemptyforgames
corresponding to continuous transportation situations with inﬁnite total demand
and without a positive lower bound on the demands.
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